Manager overconfidence phenomena as uncertainty factor in OIL-AND-GAS investment projects evaluation
Abstract
Behavior patterns of the manager, authorized by owner to make investment decisions, are analyzed. Results of empirical surveys, proving the importance of manager overconfidence phenomena consideration as an additional uncertainty factor in the investment projects evaluation, are systemized. The influences of manager overconfidence on economic evaluation of oil-and-gas investment projects are examined by applying the modification of the theoretical investment decision-making model introduced by Simon Gervais. The model solution for projects related to the project class under consideration is presented.
About the Authors
G. M. Mkrtchyan
Новосибирский государственный университет, Новосибирск
Институт экономики и организации промышленного производства СО РАН, Новосибирск
Russian Federation
Russian Federation
A. O. Kostylev
«Газпром Геросгаз Менеджмент Би.Ви.», Москва
Russian Federation
Russian Federation
L. V. Skopina
Новосибирский государственный университет, Новосибирск
Russian Federation
Russian Federation
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Review
For citations:
Mkrtchyan G.M., Kostylev A.O., Skopina L.V. Manager overconfidence phenomena as uncertainty factor in OIL-AND-GAS investment projects evaluation. World of Economics and Management. 2013;13(3):102-113. (In Russ.)
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