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Rent as a Super-Profit, as Income from Activities such as Leasing and as Corruption-Premium

Abstract

The article deals with the phenomenon called «rent». In the research authors have obtained scientific knowledge in three directions. The first new scientific result is based on the fundamental scientific fact: «All products in the competitive market are sold at a price equilibrium. Therefore, if the seller can sell goods cheaper than the equilibrium price, they extract rents as super-profits: entrepreneur or monopoly rents (including natural, mining, as well as patent, license, author)». Note that the term «entrepreneur rent» was introduced into scientific discourse for the first time in this article. The second new scientific result is based on the fundamental scientific fact: «the right of ownership includes three powers: the right of ownership, the right of use, the right of disposal». The right of possession and temporary use can be sold separately, which allows to extract the lease rent. Important fact is that rental contracts as rents (between a landlord and a tenant)  employ the concept of «time»! Note that such an understanding of rent is formalized in the Civil Code. The third new scientific result is based on the fundamental scientific fact: «any administrative (governmental) service can be carried out: (a) strictly according to instructions, or (b) initiatively, inventively, with a focus on the customer, especially if it is accompanied by a personal benefit of the service provider. The difference between formal and creative execution of duties constitutes «an increase» (discretion) to the result of the administrative acts. Corrupt official can sell this “increase”, extracting discretionary (corrupt) rent».

The article presents the formulations of the scientific facts mentioned above, the concept of «rent» formulations, relevant to these facts, as well as studies, formulas, illustrations of the identified theoretical ideas and practical examples of their manifestations.

About the Authors

Vladimir Fedorovich Komarov
Novosibirsk State University, Novosibirsk
Russian Federation


Natalja Arkadjevna Morozova
Institute for Advanced Studies of the Academy of the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation, Novosibirsk
Russian Federation


References

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Review

For citations:


Komarov V.F., Morozova N.A. Rent as a Super-Profit, as Income from Activities such as Leasing and as Corruption-Premium. World of Economics and Management. 2016;16(3):68–83. (In Russ.)

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ISSN 2542-0429 (Print)
ISSN 2658-5375 (Online)